Highlight 8/2026: Brazil’s soft power and its role within the BRICS in a multipolar world
Laura Fourneaux, 9 March 2026
In a world increasingly shaped by multipolarity, influence is no longer exercised only through military or economic strength. The concept of soft power, being the ability to shape preferences through attraction, values, and diplomacy, has become central to international relations. The BRICS group, originally composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, has recently welcomed other countries aiming to reflect this evolving global order by bringing together major emerging economies seeking greater influence in global governance. Within this framework, Brazil plays an important but constrained role, it is a strong regional power in Latin America, yet remains a secondary actor at the global level, which limits its ability to shape the BRICS agenda.
Regionally, Brazil is undeniably a central power in Latin America. It is the largest country in the region in terms of territory, population and economy. Through initiatives such as Mercosur, Brazil has promoted regional economic integration and political coordination, reinforcing its leadership role in South America. Its diplomatic tradition emphasizes peaceful conflict resolution, multilateralism, and South–South cooperation, which strengthens its credibility among neighboring countries. Brazil’s cultural influence, through music, sports and global events, also contributes to its visibility and attractiveness abroad. In Latin America, Brazil is therefore not just a participant but often a driver of regional initiatives.
However, Brazil’s position changes when viewed from the global level. Compared to other BRICS members, particularly China, Russia and increasingly India, Brazil’s material capabilities are more limited. It lacks the economic scale of China, the geopolitical assertiveness of Russia, and the demographic dynamism of India. While Brazil is active in institutions such as the United Nations and consistently calls for reforms of the IMF, World Bank, and UN Security Council, its ability to impose priorities or reshape global governance structures remains constrained. Its influence relies more on persuasion and coalition-building than on structural power.
Within BRICS, this asymmetry is palpable. Brazil tends to advocate for development-oriented cooperation, sustainability, inequality reduction and reform of global institutions. It often seeks to moderate tensions and maintain dialogue between emerging powers and Western institutions. Yet agenda-setting power within BRICS is largely shaped by actors with greater economic or strategic leverage, particularly China. Brazil can contribute to ideas and promote consensus, but it cannot easily steer the group’s overall direction. Domestic political and economic fluctuations further weaken its consistency as a global actor, reducing its capacity to project sustained leadership.
The expansion of BRICS adds another layer of complexity. As the group becomes more diverse, internal divisions increase, making coherent collective action more difficult. For Brazil, this offers both opportunity and limitation. It can position itself as a mediator within a heterogeneous coalition, but its relative weight decreases as stronger or more assertive members shape the strategic orientation of the group.
To conclude, Brazil’s soft power is real and significant, especially within Latin America, where it acts as a regional anchor of cooperation. Globally, however, it remains a secondary power. This dual position, regional strength but limited global leverage, defines its role within the BRICS : influential in discourse and bridge-building, yet constrained in its capacity to act as a decisive agenda setter in the emerging multipolar order.
Laura Fourneaux, Highlight 8/2026: Brazil’s soft power and its role within the BRICS in a multipolar world, 9 March 2026, available at www.meig.ch
The views expressed in the MEIG Highlights are personal to the authors and neither reflect the positions of the MEIG Programme nor those of the University of Geneva.